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The term “foreign direct investment” (FDI) usually brings to mind a
signiﬁcant contribution of FDI to domestic investment and to capital in-
ﬂows. However, there has been a lot of skepticism concerning the contri-
bution of FDI to these engines of growth. As noted by Froot (1991), FDI
(the purchase by a domestic resident of a controlling stake in a foreign
company) actually requires neither capital ﬂows nor investment in capac-
ity. Conceptually, FDI is an extension of corporate control over interna-
tional boundaries. Froot put it succinctly: “When Japanese-owned Bridge-
stone takes control over the US ﬁrm Firestone, capital need not ﬂow into
the US. US domestic lenders can largely ﬁnance the equity purchase.
Any borrowing by Bridgestone from foreign-based third parties also does
not qualify as FDI (although it would count as an inﬂow of portfolio cap-
ital into the US). And, of course, in such acquisition there is no investment
expenditure; merely an international transfer in the title of corporate
assets.” Does this example capture the essence of FDI in emerging econ-
omies?
The answer we provide in this paper, based on a new theory and new em-
pirical evidence, is that FDI ﬂows do play an important role in the skim-
ming of high-productivity investment projects and thereby contribute sig-
niﬁcantly to domestic investment in both the quantity and the quality
dimensions.
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Theories of FDI can essentially be divided into two categories: micro
(industrial organization) theories and macro ﬁnance (cost of capital) theo-
ries. The early literature that explains FDI in microeconomic terms focuses
on market imperfections and on the desire of multinational enterprises
to expand their market power (see Caves 1971). Subsequent literature
centered more on ﬁrm-speciﬁc advantages, owing to product superiority
or cost advantages that stemmed from economies of scale, multiplant
economies and advanced technology, or superior marketing and distribu-
tion (see Helpman 1984). According to this view, multinationals ﬁnd it
cheaper to expand directly in a foreign country, rather than through trade,
in cases where the advantages associated with cost or product are based on
internal, indivisible assets based on knowledge and technology. Alternative
explanations for FDI have focused on regulatory restrictions, including
tariﬀs and quotas, that either encourage or discourage cross-border acqui-
sitions, depending on whether one considers horizontal or vertical inte-
grations.
Studies examining the macroeconomic eﬀects of exchange rate on FDI
focused on the positive eﬀects of an exchange rate depreciation of the host
country on FDI inﬂows, because it lowers the cost of production and in-
vestment in the host countries, raising the proﬁtability of FDI. The wealth
eﬀect is another channel through which a depreciation of the real exchange
rate could raise FDI. A depreciation of the real exchange rate, by raising
the relative wealth of foreign ﬁrms, could make it easier for those ﬁrms to
use retained proﬁts to ﬁnance investment abroad and to post a collateral in
borrowing from domestic lenders in the host country capital market (see
Froot 1991 and Razin and Sadka 2003). There is also a large literature on
diﬀerent forms of spillovers from inward investors in the form of new tech-
nologies, new ideas, and capital accumulation on the growth of output in
the domestic economy (see Blomström, Kokko, and Globerman 2001).
What is the essential diﬀerence between portfolio investment and FDI
investment from the point of view of corporate governance?
Management under portfolio equity ownership may be plagued by a
free-rider problem. Under dispersed ownership, if an individual share-
holder does something to improve the quality of management, the beneﬁts
will also accrue to all other shareholders (see Hart 2000). In contrast, the
FDI investor, who is endowed with management skills and gains control of
the ﬁrm, has better incentives to pursue proper monitoring of management
and will be in a better position to micromanage the ﬁrm. Furthermore,
based on possessing “intangible capital” in his or her source country, the
FDI investor can apply more eﬃcient management standards in the host
country compared to domestic investors. Thus, the unique advantage to
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micromanagement, based on the specialization in niches of industry. Im-
portant issues with FDI from this standpoint are (1) what the salient char-
acteristics are of the free-FDI-ﬂows equilibrium, when FDI investors take
control over domestic ﬁrms; (2) what constitutes the gains from FDI ﬂows
to the host economy, given that the foreign investors appropriate the
private rewards resulting from their superior management skills; and
(3) whether or not the free-FDI-ﬂows regime is more eﬃcient than free-
portfolio-ﬂows regime.
In an integrated capital market, with full information, all forms of capi-
tal ﬂows (FDI, loans, and portfolio equity and debt) are indistinguishable.
In the presence of incomplete information, these ﬂows are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from one another. In Razin and Sadka (2002), we developed a
stylized model of FDI in the presence of imperfect information with re-
spect to the ﬁrm’s productivity.
We formalized the unique advantage of FDI investment over other types
of investment in a stylized model. Suppose that initially all ﬁrms are still
owned by original (domestic) uninformed owners, and suppose that the
productivity shock is purely idiosyncratic. At the beginning of the ﬁrst pe-
riod, when investment decisions are made, ﬁrms are still uninformed about
the productivity shock (the productivity level of the speciﬁc ﬁrm that they
own). It will be revealed only in the second period, when output from new
capital becomes public knowledge. In order to make new investment the
ﬁrm must ﬁrst incur a ﬁxed setup cost. As the ﬁrms are all ex ante identi-
cal, if they have to make the investment decision based on this level of in-
formation, they will all invest the same, in accordance with the expected
level of the productivity factor. Assume now that at this stage, before the
productivity factor is known, foreign direct investors step in. Upon ac-
quiring and eﬀectively managing the ﬁrm, the FDI investor can better
monitor the productivity of the ﬁrm than his or her domestic investor
counterpart. He or she can thus ﬁne-tune the level of capital stock more
closely to the value of the productivity factor. Anticipating this ﬁne-tuned
investment schedule, the value of the ﬁrm to the potential FDI investor is
larger than the reservation value to the original owner and the correspon-
ding bid value to potential domestic investors. Therefore, FDI investors
will outbid domestic investors for the ﬁrms in the domestic industry. Com-
petition among potential FDI investors will drive the price up close to the
price that reﬂects the upgraded management of the ﬁrm. The initial do-
mestic owners will gain the rent, which is equal to diﬀerence between the
FDI investor’s shadow price and the initial owner’s reservation price.
If the competition between potential FDI investors is perfect,all the ben-
eﬁts from the superior FDI management skills accrue to the host economy,
leaving the FDI investors with a return on their investment just equalling
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can in this case be classiﬁed into two categories. First, there are the con-
ventional gains that stem from opening the economy to the new ﬂow of
capital, thereby allowing a more eﬃcient intertemporal allocation of con-
sumption (e.g., via consumption smoothing). Second, there are the intrin-
sic gains associated with the superior micromanagement by FDI investors.
The entire gain of the FDI investors is captured by the domestic economy
because of assumed perfect competition among these investors over the
domestic ﬁrms. If, however, there is imperfect competition among FDI in-
vestors, the gains will split between them and the host country.
The economic gains from FDI, relative to portfolio inﬂows, lie only in
the eﬃciency of investment, since in both cases there are consumption-
smoothing eﬀects and the same world interest rate (r) prevails in the host
country in both the FDI-ﬂows regime and the portfolio-ﬂows regime. In
other words, the gains from FDI, in comparison to portfolio ﬂows, do not
include the traditional gains from opening up the domestic capital market
to foreign capital inﬂows because these traditional gains are also present in
the portfolio-ﬂows regime. Razin and Sadka (2002) were able also to show
that, under some plausible conditions on the form of the production func-
tion, the size of the aggregate stock of capital is larger under FDI than un-
der portfolio equity ﬂows.
5.3 The Evidence1
Like its theoretical counterpart, empirical work has tended to focus ei-
ther on underlying factors to explain the location of FDI ﬂows across
countries or on explaining the cyclical behaviour of FDI ﬂows using macro-
economic variables and assessing the contribution of FDI ﬂows to invest-
ment and growth.
To what extent is there empirical support for such claims of the signiﬁ-
cant impact of FDI on domestic investment?
5.3.1 Previous Literature
A comprehensive study by Bosworth and Collins (1999) provides evi-
dence concerning the eﬀect of capital inﬂows on domestic investment for
ﬁfty-eight developing countries during 1978–95. The authors distinguish
among three types of inﬂows: FDI, portfolio investment, and other ﬁnan-
cial ﬂows (primarily bank loans). Bosworth and Collins ﬁnd that an in-
crease of a dollar in capital inﬂows is associated with an increase in do-
mestic investment of about ﬁfty cents. (Both capital inﬂows and domestic
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1. See Borensztein, DeGregorio, and Lee (1998) and Bosworth and Collins (1999) for a sim-
ilar panel data analysis.investment are expressed as percentages of gross domestic product
[GDP]). This result, however, masks signiﬁcant diﬀerences among diﬀer-
ent types of inﬂows. Foreign direct investment appears to bring about close
to a one-for-one increase in domestic investment; there is virtually no dis-
cernible relationship between portfolio inﬂows and investment (little or no
impact), and the impact of loans falls between those of the other two. These
results hold both for the ﬁfty-eight-country sample and for a subset of
eighteen emerging markets (see ﬁg. 5.1).
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Fig. 5.1 Estimated impact of capital ﬂows on domestic investment
Source: Loungani and Razin (2001), based on Bosworth and Collins (1999).
Note:The height of the bar represents the estimated impact of $1 of the indicated capital ﬂow
on domestic investment.An additional (striking) feature of FDI ﬂows that was noted in previous
literature is that the share of FDI in total inﬂows is higher in riskier coun-
tries, as measured either by countries’ credit ratings for sovereign (govern-
ment) debt or other indicators of country risk (see ﬁg. 5.2). There is also
some evidence that the FDI share is higher in countries where the quality
of corporate governance institutions is lower. What can explain these
seemingly paradoxical ﬁndings? One explanation is that FDI is more likely,
compared with other forms of capital ﬂows, to take place in countries with
missing or ineﬃcient markets. In such settings, foreign investors will prefer
to operate directly instead of relying on local ﬁnancial markets, suppliers,
or legal arrangements.
5.3.2 Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment Flows:
AG ravity Model
Razin, Rubinstein, and Sadka (2003) employ a gravity model of bilat-
eral FDI and portfolio capital ﬂows in order to explain determinants of the
mobility of ﬁnancial capital across countries. The authors estimate jointly
a participation equation (the decision whether to export FDI at all) and a
gravity equation (the decision how much FDI exports to make). They ﬁnd
that the error terms in these two equations are negatively and signiﬁcantly
correlated. The negative correlation suggests that the source countries
with relatively low set up costs of FDI investment are also those with high
marginal productivity of capital. These ﬁndings are summarized in table
5.1.
In Mody, Razin, and Sadka (2002) we interpret the industry specializa-
tion measure in the source country as an indication of a comparative ad-
vantage to the potential foreign direct investors in eliciting good invest-
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Fig. 5.2 FDI’s share in total inﬂows is higher in countries with weaker credit ratings
Source: Albuquerque (2003).ment opportunities in the destination country, relative to domestic in-
vestors in the host country. This advantage may stem, for example, from
the ability of FDI investors to apply better industry-speciﬁc microman-
agement standards. To capture this element we assume a lower cost of
cream skimming (of high-productivity ﬁrms) on the part of foreign direct
investors. The second category of variables underscores the role of infor-
mation as a determinant of FDI inﬂows. As banks are the main providers
of debt capital in emerging markets, and they usually conduct rigorous
scrutiny of the creditworthiness of their debtors, we conjecture that, ceteris
paribus, ﬁrms with high debt-equity ratio tend to be more transparent. In
this case, the advantage of FDI investors in their cream-skimming skills
(that is, the selection of high-productivity ﬁrms) is less pronounced and
therefore FDI inﬂows are less abundant.
5.4 Capital Inﬂows, Investment in Capacity, and Growth: Panel Data
5.4.1 Empirical Framework for the Panel-Data Analysis
In this subsection I describe the econometric approach for the estima-
tion of the interactions between domestic investment, FDI ﬂows, interna-
tional loans, and international portfolio investment. The sample consists
of sixty-four developing countries, including Israel,2 in the period 1976 to
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Table 5.1 Determinants of FDI in a Gravity Equation and Selection Equation
Gravity Selection
Host GDP per capita 0.762 0.264
(0.054) (0.030)
Source GDP per capita 0.002 1.928
(0.207) (0.073)
Common language 1.209 0.024
(0.085) (0.049)
Average years of schooling (host) 0.087 0.000
(0.023) (0.014)




No. of observations 9,848 9,843
Source: Razin, Rubinstein, and Sadka (2003).
Notes: Maximum livelihood estimation: FDI (real US$) from source to destination country
(1981–98, three-year averages). Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
2. This section draws on Hecht, Razin, and Shinar (2003).1997 (twenty-two years in total; see appendix A). All the variables but the
dummies are expressed in terms of GDP percentages. The source of data is
the World Development Indicators (WDI) database (see appendix A). The
system of equations is given by
1. I    i1j    i2I(–1)    i3DY    i4DY(–1)    i5FDI    i6P    i7L 
   i8G
2. FDI    f1j    f2FDI(–1)    f3I    f4DY    f5DY(–1)    f6Res2
3. L    l1j    l2L(–1)    l3I    l4DY    l5DY(–1)
4. P    p1j    p2P(–1)    p3I    p4DY    p5DY(–1)    p6Res1,
where
I   gross domestic investment (% of GDP)
FDI   foreign direct investment (% of GDP)
L   bank loans (% of GDP)
P   portfolio investment ﬂows (% of GDP)
DY   annual percentage growth rate of GDP
G   general government consumption (% of GDP)
Res1  multiple exchange rates (single exchange rate  0; more than one  1)
Res2   restrictions on current account transactions (no controls   0; con-
trols   1)
j   country index, j   01, 02, 03, . . . , 64
The four-equation system has four endogenous variables: I, FDI, P, and
L as dependent variables and observations. Every equation also includes,
as an explanatory variable, the dependent variable lagged one period. The
exogenous variables used for identiﬁcation are government expenditure
(G), a dummy variable for multiple exchange rates (Res1), a dummy vari-
able for restrictions on current account transactions (Res2), and lagged de-
pendent variables.
Table 5.2 describes the interactions among the endogenous and the ex-
ogenous variables in the four-equation system.
Two versions are estimated: ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, as
a benchmark, and two-stage least squares (TSLS) regressions with a coun-
try-speciﬁc eﬀect. To avoid nonstationarity of the residuals in the four-
equation system, we introduce lagged dependent variables on the right-
hand side of the equation system.
5.4.2 Domestic Investment: Findings
Tables 5.3 through 5.6 present the estimation results, and we discuss
them equation by equation.
156 Assaf RazinWe start with table 5.3, which describes the eﬀects of capital inﬂows on
domestic investment.
The coeﬃcient of FDI is signiﬁcant in the OLS and TSLS regressions.
Long-run FDI eﬀect on domestic investment is 0.94 in the OLS regression
and 0.68 in the TSLS regression. Thus, potential for an upward bias in the
OLS estimation procedure appears to be validated. Indeed the eﬀect of
FDI on domestic investment is smaller in TSLS regressions. The loan co-
eﬃcient is signiﬁcant and positive in both the OLS and the TSLS regres-
sions, at a similar magnitude. However, the long-run coeﬃcient (adjusted
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Table 5.2 Expected Interactions among Endogenous and Exogenous Variables
Endogenous
Variables Exogenous Variables
FDI PLII (–1) FDI(–1) P(–1) L(–1) DY DY(–1) G Res2 Res1
I             
FDI         
P         
L       
Table 5.3 Determinants of Domestic Investment in Capacity
OLS TSLS
Foreign direct investment, FDI 0.16 0.23
(5.2) (6.8)
Loan inﬂows, L –0.06 0.12
(–2.2) (3.0)
Portfolio inﬂows, P 0.03 0.18
(0.3) (2.0)
Lagged domestic investment, I(–1) 0.87 0.66
(96.1) (51.2)
Output growth, DY 0.15 0.15
(10.4) (10.9)
Lagged output growth, DY(–1) 0.06 0.06
(3.8) (4.4)
Government expenditure, G 0.03 0.01
(2.3) (0.5)
Long-run eﬀect of FDI on I 0.94 0.68
Long-run eﬀect of L on I –0.35 0.35
Long-run eﬀect of P on I 0.18 0.53
R2 adjusted 0.40 0.53
Notes:Estimated using Eviews software. I(–1), FDI, P, L, and Gare in terms of ratio to GDP;
t-values appear in parentheses.for the lag structure of the regression) moves up from –0.35 in the TSLS re-
gression. The coeﬃcient of the portfolio-investment variable is not signiﬁ-
cant in the OLS regression and becomes signiﬁcant in the TSLS regression.
Interestingly, the long-run eﬀect of FDI on domestic investment, 0.68, ex-
ceeds the corresponding eﬀect of portfolio investment, 0.53, which in turn
exceeds the eﬀect of loans, 0.35.
Foreign Direct Investment Inﬂows
Table 5.4 describes the eﬀect of domestic investment on FDI inﬂows, al-
lowing for the eﬀects of a group of other traditional variables, such as
growth and capital controls.
The coeﬃcient of domestic investment is positive and signiﬁcant in both
the OLS and the TSLS regression. The long-run eﬀect in the OLS (0.08) is
smaller than in the TSLS (0.14).
Loan Inﬂows
Table 5.5 describes the eﬀect of domestic investment on loan inﬂows, al-
lowing for the eﬀect of growth. The coeﬃcient of domestic investment is
negative and nonsigniﬁcant in the OLS but positive and signiﬁcant in the
TSLS regression. The long-run eﬀect moves up from –0.03 in the OLS re-
gression to 0.08 in the TSLS regression.
Portfolio Inﬂows
Table 5.6describes the eﬀect of domestic investment on portfolio invest-
ment inﬂows. The explanatory power of the regression is poor, however,
and most of the right-hand-side variables have nonsigniﬁcant coeﬃcients.
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Table 5.4 Determinants of FDI Inﬂows
OLS TSLS
Domestic investment, I 0.03 0.07
(3.0) (5.0)
Lagged foreign direct investment, FDI(–1) 0.60 0.50
(19.6) (16.0)
Output growth, DY 0.01 0.02
(0.10) (1.6)
Lagged output growth, DY(–1) –0.01 0.02
(–0.1) (1.3)
Dummy for capital controls, Res2 –0.03 –0.02
(no controls   0; controls   1) (–2.1) (–1.2)
Long-run eﬀect of I on FDI 0.08 0.14
R2 adjusted 0.13 0.29
Notes: FDI and I are in terms of ratio to GDP; t-values appear in parentheses.The Contribution of FDI Flows to Domestic Investment in Capacity 159
Table 5.5 Determinants of Loans Inﬂows
OLS TSLS
Domestic investment, I –0.01 0.04
(1.4) (3.0)
Lagged L, L(–1) 0.66 0.50
(22.9) (16.7)
Output growth, DY 0.01 –0.001
(0.8) (–0.05)
Lagged output growth, DY(–1) 0.02 –0.0002
(1.2) (–0.02)
Long-run eﬀect of I on L –0.03 0.08
R2 adjusted 0.24 0.25
Notes: L(–1) and I are in terms of ratio to GDP; t-values appear in parentheses.
Table 5.6 Determinants of Portfolio Investment Inﬂows
OLS TSLS
Domestic investment, I 0.004 0.01
(0.5) (0.7)
Lagged portfolio investment, P(–1) 0.46 0.40
(4.8) (4.8)
Output growth, DY 0.001 –0.001
(0.2) (–0.1)
Lagged output growth, DY(–1) 0.007 0.004
(0.5) (0.3)
Dummy for multiple exchange rates, Res1 –0.001 –0.002
(one exchange rate   0; more than one   1) (–0.6) (–0.9)
Long-run eﬀect of I on portfolio investment ﬂows 0.007 0.017
R2 adjusted 0.03 0.13
Notes: P(–1) and I are in terms of ratio to GDP; t-values appear in parentheses.
The regression analysis eﬀectively ﬂashes out an autocorrelation process
of the portfolio investment ﬂows.
5.4.3 The Contribution of Capital Inﬂows to Output Growth: Findings
In this section we estimate the contribution of FDI, loans, and portfolio
investment to output growths. Similarly to the empirical framework in the
ﬁrst subsection of section 5.3.3, the system of equations is given by
1. DY    i1j   i2DY(–1)    i3I   i4I(–1)    i5FDI    i6P    i7L   i8G
   i9Log(GDP)
2. FDI    f1j    f 2FDI(–1)    f 3DY    f4I    f5I(–1)    f6Res2 
   f7Log(GDP)
3. L    l1j    l2L(– 1)    l3DY    l4I    l5I(–1)    l6Log(GDP)160 Assaf Razin
Table 5.7 Expected Interactions between Endogenous and Exogenous Variables
Endogenous
Variables Exogenous Variables
FDI PLDY DY(–1) FDI(–1) P(–1) L(–1) Log(GDP) II (–1) G Res2 Res1
I             
FDI           
P           
L         
4. P    p1j    p2P(–1)    p3DY    p4I    p5I(–1)    p6Res1 
   p7Log(GDP),
where
G   general government consumption (% of GDP)
FDI   foreign direct investment (% of GDP)
L   bank loans (% of GDP)
P   portfolio investment ﬂows (% of GDP)
I   gross domestic investment (% of GDP)
DY   annual percentage growth rate of GDP
Res1  multiple exchange rates (single exchange rate  0; more than one  1)
Res2   restrictions on current account transactions (no controls   0; con-
trols   1)
Log (GDP)   natural logarithm of GDP
j   country index, j   01, 02, 03, . . . , 64
Table 5.7 describes the interactions among the endogenous and the ex-
ogenous variable in the four-equation system.
Output Growth
Table 5.8 describes the eﬀects of capital inﬂows on growth. The coeﬃ-
cient of FDI is signiﬁcant in the OLS and TSLS regressions. Long-run FDI
eﬀect on output growth is 0.1 in the OLS regression and 0.23 in the TSLS
regression. The eﬀect of FDI on output growth is smaller in TSLS regres-
sions. Thus, potential for a downward bias in the OLS estimation proce-
dure appears to be demonstrated. The long-run coeﬃcient in the TSLS re-
gression is 0.23.
The loan coeﬃcient and the portfolio coeﬃcient are not signiﬁcant in
the OLS and the TSLS regressions. However, the long-run coeﬃcient of
portfolio ﬂows exceeds 0.1.
Foreign Direct Investment Inﬂows
Table 5.9 describes the eﬀect of output growth on FDI inﬂows, allowing
for the eﬀects of a group of other control variables, such as domestic in-
vestment and capital controls.Table 5.8 Determinants of Growth
OLS TSLS
Foreign direct investment, FDI 0.09 0.20
(3.0) (5.0)
Loan inﬂows, L 0.01 0.02
(0.2) (0.4)
Portfolio inﬂows, P 0.05 0.10
(0.6) (1.0)
Lagged output growth, DY(–1) 0.12 0.12
(7.6) (6.9)
Domestic investment, I 0.27 0.24
(14.4) (11.4)
Lagged domestic investment, I(–1) –0.22 –0.18
(–12.1) (–9.1)




Long-run eﬀect of FDI on DY 0.1 0.23
Long-run eﬀect of L on DY 0.01 0.02
Long-run eﬀect of P on DY 0.06 0.11
R2 adjusted 0.04 0.1
Notes: I(–1), FDI, P, L, and G are in terms of ratio to GDP; t-values appear in parentheses.
Table 5.9 Determinants of FDI Inﬂows
OLS TSLS
Output growth, DY 0.02 0.05
(1.3) (2.2)
Lagged foreign direct investment, FDI(–1) 0.45 0.49
(13.4) (13.4)
Domestic investment, I 0.07 0.08
(3.8) (3.7)
Lagged domestic investment, I(–1) –0.01 –0.01
(–0.5) (–0.4)
Dummy for capital controls, Res2 –0.002 –0.002
(no controls   0; controls   1) (–0.1) (–0.8)
Log(GDP) 0.01 0.01
(3.5) (3.0)
Long-run eﬀect of DY on FDI 0.04 0.05
R2 adjusted 0.26 0.3
Notes: FDI and I are in terms of ratio to GDP; t-values appear in parentheses.The coeﬃcient of output growth is positive and signiﬁcant in the TSLS
regression. The long-run eﬀect is 0.05.
Loan Inﬂows
Table 5.10 describes the eﬀect of output growth on loans inﬂows, allow-
ing for the eﬀect of domestic investment. The coeﬃcient of output growth
is nonsigniﬁcant in both the regressions.
Portfolio Inﬂows
Table 5.11 describes the eﬀect of output growth on portfolio investment
inﬂows. The explanatory power of the regression is poor, however, and
most of the right-hand-side variables have nonsigniﬁcant coeﬃcients. The
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Table 5.10 Determinants of Loans Inﬂows
OLS TSLS
Output growth, DY –0.005 –0.005
(–0.3) (–0.2)
Lagged L, L(–1) 0.49 0.49
(14.2) (14.0)
Domestic investment, I 0.06 0.07
(3.2) (3.4)




Long-run eﬀect of I on L –0.01 –0.01
R2 adjusted 0.27 0.27
Notes: L(–1) and I are in terms of ratio to GDP; t-values appear in parentheses.
Table 5.11 Determinants of Portfolio Investment Inﬂows
OLS TSLS
Output growth, DY –0.0004 0.003
(–0.025) (0.12)
Lagged portfolio investment, P(–1) 0.37 0.37
(3.9) (3.9)
Domestic investment, I 0.003 0.001
(0.2) (0.05)
Lagged domestic investment, I(–1) 0.01 0.01
(0.3) (0.4)
Dummy for multiple exchange rates, Res1 –0.002 –0.002
(one exchange rate   0; more than one   1) (–0.72) (–0.6)
Long-run eﬀect of I on Port 0 0
R2 adjusted 0.15 0.15
Notes: P(–1) and I are in terms of ratio to GDP; t-values appear in parentheses.regression analysis eﬀectively ﬂashes out an autocorrelation process of the
portfolio investment ﬂows.
Summary
We now summarize the main ﬁndings of the panel data analysis con-
cerning interactions between capital inﬂows and investment in capacity (or
growth):
1. Foreign direct investment ﬂows have a larger (independent) eﬀect on
domestic investment in capacity (or growth) than loan inﬂows or foreign-
portfolio inﬂows.
2. Domestic investment in capacity (or output growth) has more pro-
nounced eﬀects on FDI inﬂows than on either loan inﬂows or foreign-
portfolio inﬂows.
5.5 Conclusion
Kindleberger (1969) suggests that in order to think about FDI we must
ask not why capital might ﬂow into a country, but rather why some partic-
ular asset would be worth more under foreign than under domestic control.
In this chapter I discuss empirical implications of a new theory of FDI,
which captures a unique feature: hands-on management standards that en-
able investors to react in real time to the changing economic environment
surrounding the investors. Equipped with superior managerial skills, for-
eign direct investors are able to outbid portfolio investors for the top pro-
ductivity ﬁrms in a particular industry in which they have specialized in the
source country. Consequently, FDI investors would make investment both
larger and higher quality than the domestic investors. The theory can ex-
plain both two-way FDI ﬂows among developed countries and one-way
FDI ﬂows from developed to developing countries. Gains to the host coun-
try from FDI stem from the informational value of FDI.
Main predictions of the theory are consistent with evidence from panel
data: Larger FDI coeﬃcients in the domestic-investment and output-
growth regressions relative to the portfolio equity and international loans
inﬂow coeﬃcients reﬂect a unique role for FDI in the domestic investment
and growth process.
Does this mean that the chapter brings out a case for subsidizing either
domestic investment in capacity (because it brings in more FDI) or FDI
(because it helps domestic investment in capacity and growth)?
A cautionary word based on the Irish case is in order. One can argue,
convincingly, that the heavy subsidization of FDI inﬂows in Ireland in the
past two decades resulted in impressive GDP growth rates but with less
pronounced eﬀect on the well-being of Irish residents, as crudely measured
by the Irish gross national product growth rates. Thus, gains to the host
The Contribution of FDI Flows to Domestic Investment in Capacity 163country are not fully captured by the increase in domestic investment in ca-
pacity, to which FDI inﬂows give rise.
Appendix A
List of Sixty-Four Countries in HRS Estimation
Algeria Costa Rica Korea, Republic of Rwanda
Argentina Côte d’Ivoire Lesotho Senegal
Bangladesh Dominica Malawi Sierra Leone
Belize Ecuador Malaysia South Africa
Benin Egypt, Arab Republic of Mali Sri Lanka
Bolivia Gabon Mauritania St. Vincent and the 
Botswana The Gambia Mauritius Grenadines
Brazil Ghana Mexico Swaziland
Burkina Faso Grenada Morocco Syrian Arab Republic
Burundi Guatemala Nepal Thailand
Cameroon Guyana Niger Togo
Central African  India Nigeria Trinidad and Tobago
Republic Indonesia Pakistan Tunisia
Chad Israel Papua New Guinea Uruguay
Chile Jamaica Peru Zambia
Colombia Jordan The Philippines Zimbabwe
Congo, Republic of the Kenya
Sources of Data
The principal source of data is the World Bank WDI 2000 CD-ROM.
Capital control data were taken from IMF publications.
A few missing data items regarding loans for Israel were taken from the
Bank of Israel resources.
Appendix B
Deﬁnitions of Series
Terms of trade: (DTT) adjustment (constant LCU) (NY.TTF.GNFS.KN).
The terms-of-trade eﬀect equals capacity to import less exports of goods
and services in constant prices. Data are in constant local currency. The
change is calculated as the diﬀerence from one year to the other.
Public spending on education: (ED3), total (% of GNP, UNESCO)
(SE.XPD.TOTL.GN.ZS). Public expenditure on education (total) is the
percentage of GNP accounted for by public spending on public education
plus subsidies to private education at the primary, secondary, and tertiary
levels. For more information, see WDI table 2.9.
164 Assaf RazinGDP per capita: (CY), PPP (current international $) (NY.GDP.PCAP.
PP.CD). GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). GDP
PPP is gross domestic product converted to international dollars using
PPP rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over
GDP as the U.S. dollar in the United States. Data are in current interna-
tional dollars. For more information, see WDI tables 1.1, 4.11, and 4.12.
For the estimation we used the logarithm of CY.
Foreign direct investment: (FDI), net inﬂows (% of GDP) (BX.KLT.
DINV.DT.GD.ZS). Foreign direct investment is net inﬂows of investment
to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting
stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the in-
vestor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-
term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments.
For more information, see WDI table 5.1.
General government consumption: (G) (% of GDP) (NE.CON.GOVT.
ZS). General government consumption includes all current spending for
purchases of goods and services (including wages and salaries). It also in-
cludes most expenditures on national defense and security but excludes
government military expenditures that are part of government capital for-
mation. For more information, see WDI table 4.9.
Gross domestic investment: (I) (% of GDP) (NE.GDI.TOTL.ZS).Gross
domestic investment consists of outlays on additions to the ﬁxed assets of
the economy plus net changes in the level of inventories. Fixed assets in-
clude land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on); plant, ma-
chinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, railways,
and the like, including commercial and industrial buildings, oﬃces,
schools, hospitals, and private residential dwellings. Inventories are stocks
of goods held by ﬁrms to meet temporary or unexpected ﬂuctuations in
production or sales. For more information, see WDI tables 1.4 and 4.9.
GDP growth: (DY) (annual %) (NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG). Annual per-
centage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local cur-
rency. Aggregates are based on constant 1995 U.S. dollars. For more infor-
mation, see WDI tables 4.1 and 4.2.
Portfolio investment: (P), excluding LCFAR (BoP, current US$) (BN.
KLT.PTXL.CD). Portfolio investment excluding liabilities constituting
foreign authorities’ reserves covers transactions in equity securities and
debt securities. Data are in current U.S. dollars. This series was divided in
the matching GDP to get the portfolio investment as a share of GDP.
Bank and trade-trade lending: (L) (PPG   PNG) (NFL, current US$)
(DT.NFL.PCBO.CD). Bank and trade-related lending covers commercial
bank lending and other private credits. Data are in current U.S. dollars. For
more information, see WDI table 6.7. This series was divided in the match-
ing GDP to get the loans ﬂows as a share of GDP.
Total ﬁnancial ﬂows: (TLY64F) is the sum of FDI, total portfolio ﬂows
The Contribution of FDI Flows to Domestic Investment in Capacity 165(PLY64), and total loans (OLY64), where ﬂows are divided by GDP. Data
include sixty-four developing countries.
Capital controls: Data on capital controls for all IMF member coun-
tries, years 1966–97. Dummy takes the value 1 when a restriction is in
place, and 0 otherwise.
1. Multiple exchange rates (Res1)
2. Restrictions on current account transactions (Res2)
3. Restrictions on capital account transactions (Res3)
4. Surrender of export proceeds (Res4)
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Comment Kyoji Fukao
Assaf Razin’s paper proposes an interesting new theory of foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI). The new theory is based on the following two assump-
tions:
1. Some foreign investors can get information on the optimal invest-
ment level of local ﬁrms at a lower ﬁxed cost than ﬁrms in the host country.
2. A potential buyer needs to acquire the local ﬁrm in order to apply its
technology.
According to Razin, FDI is the result of informational advantages of
foreign ﬁrms. In contrast with this, the standard theory regards FDI as in-
ternational movements of intangible assets, such as the stock of techno-
logical knowledge or marketing know-how.1 Foreign ﬁrms conduct direct
investment because they can carry out production at a lower cost or have
better marketing skills. Since international mergers and acquisitions
(M&As) have increased substantially in the last decade and asymmetric in-
formation issues seem to play an important role in M&A processes, Razin’s
new theory is very timely and provides a useful contribution to the study
on international M&As.
I have three comments. My ﬁrst comment is on the applicability of the
new theory to “green ﬁeld” investments. Although cross-border M&As
have rapidly increased especially in the case of FDI among developed
economies, the majority of direct investments into developing economies
are still of the “green ﬁeld” type. Table 5C.1 shows the share of M&A-type
investments in total FDI ﬂows in each region during the period from 1997
to 1999. According to this table, in the case of FDI inﬂows into developing
Asia, only 21 percent of total FDI consisted of M&As. In Razin’s paper the
new theory is applied to the empirical study based on data of total FDI
ﬂows. I think that the author had better elaborate on the applicability of his
new theory to green ﬁeld investments.
My second comment concerns the identiﬁcation problem. In the empir-
ical part of the paper, the author provides several interesting pieces of evi-
The Contribution of FDI Flows to Domestic Investment in Capacity 167
Kyoji Fukao is professor of economics at the Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi
University, and a fellow at the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry.
1. On the standard theory of FDI, see Caves (1982) and Dunning (1977).dence that are consistent with the prediction of the theory: Compared with
portfolio investment, inward FDI has a larger positive eﬀect on domestic
investment and economic growth in the host country. Although such ﬁnd-
ings are interesting, the “evidence” provided does not prove the validity of
the new theory since we can also explain these phenomena using the stan-
dard theory. According to the standard theory, FDI will increase the stock
of intangible assets, such as technological knowledge or marketing know-
how in the host country, which will enhance domestic investment and eco-
nomic growth. I hope that in future the author provides us with some new
implications and tests by which we can empirically distinguish the new the-
ory from the standard theory.
My last comment is on the relationship between a parent company and
its aﬃliates abroad. In East Asian manufacturing industry, there exist close
linkages and coordination between parents and their aﬃliates. Production
processes are commonly fragmented within an enterprise group, and un-
skilled labor–intensive processes are located in developing countries such
as China.2 Multinationals engage in FDI in developing East Asia not to
make proﬁts from their superior knowledge on investment timing but to es-
tablish eﬃcient global production networks by combining their advanced
technologies with developing countries’ cheap labor.
To sum up my comments, Razin’s paper gives us important new insights
on FDI, especially on M&As, but it seems that we cannot directly apply his
theory to eﬃciency-seeking green ﬁeld–type FDI in manufacturing indus-
tries, which is the dominant form of FDI in East Asia.
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Central and Eastern Europe 34
Developing Asia 21
Developing countries total 30
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2000, 2000.
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Comment Dean Parham
Assaf Razin’s paper is now rather diﬀerent from the one he presented at
EASE-13. I have adapted my comments by generalizing my original re-
marks and adding a few more that are speciﬁcally directed at the paper as
it now stands. My remarks have been informed in part by material pro-
vided in a recent study of foreign direct investment by the Productivity
Commission (2002).
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is an important issue. It has been grow-
ing faster than world GDP, especially since the late 1990s (ﬁg. 5C.1). The
author’s work investigates “commercial” motivations for FDI, which are
becoming more important in a world of fewer barriers to investment ﬂows
and growing maturity of ﬁnancial markets and institutions. The relative
importance of commercial motives was illustrated in a recent survey of
Australian ﬁrms engaging in outward FDI (ﬁgs. 5C.2 and 5C.3).
The paper also distinguishes between FDI, portfolio investment, and
loans. It recognizes that free-rider problems induce diﬀerent behavior on
the part of FDI and portfolio investors. Foreign direct investment is seen
to promote growth through a higher amount and more eﬃcient allocation
of investment. Some prima facie support for this proposition lies in the im-
provement (or lessened deterioration) in capital productivity growth in
Australia that has coincided with increased inward FDI in the 1980s and
1990s (ﬁg. 5C.4).
The examination of FDI, portfolio, and loan ﬂows and their eﬀects on
domestic investment ﬂows—all in a simultaneous framework—is the main
novel feature of the paper. I will make a few comments about the theoreti-
cal motivation in the paper before looking at the empirical results.
Theoretical Motivation
Necessary preconditions for FDI are commonly thought to include the
following factors:
• The foreign ﬁrm has some ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets (e.g., proprietary tech-
nology, know-how) that it wishes to use to advantage.
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• There are advantages in internalizing operations (through a branch
operation) rather than relying on markets to exchange goods and ser-
vices between foreign and local ﬁrms. For example, there may be diﬃ-
culties in specifying requirements between foreign and local ﬁrms by
means of contracts—a problem that may be intensiﬁed with the
growth in “knowledge-intensive” production processes.
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Fig. 5C.1 Global trends in outward FDI ﬂows and GDP (index 1995   100)
Source: Productivity Commission (2002).
1. Advantages, such as lower transportation costs, need to outweigh disadvantages of per-
haps less local knowledge, and so on.
Fig. 5C.2 Commercial motives for oﬀshore production
Source: Productivity Commission (2002).The paper identiﬁes an advantage to the foreign ﬁrm in the form of su-
perior micromanagement. This most clearly ﬁts with the ﬁrst of the afore-
mentioned motivations. But it has more to do with management skill than
proprietary technology. It confers an advantage on FDI that is not avail-
able to portfolio investment.
The theoretical speciﬁcation appears to invoke some simpliﬁcations.
The foreign-ﬁrm advantage, in the form of better micromanagement, can
be available to all foreign ﬁrms. Foreign ﬁrms are able to compete away the
gains from their advantage. But the advantage is available to no domestic
ﬁrm. This seems to require a production factor that can jump everywhere,
except over country borders (or, more speciﬁcally, the border to the one
country considered as a target).
Domestic ﬁrms appear to be homogeneous with respect to productivity
performance (and inferior management). In practice, foreign ﬁrms are
likely to decide on
• whether to establish a local branch presence (with brand name) or take
over a local ﬁrm; and,
• if they decide on a takeover, whether to take over high-performing or
underperforming ﬁrms, depending on expectations of productivity (or
proﬁt) growth across the range of ﬁrms.
The foreign-ﬁrm advantage can be competed away and captured by the
domestic economy in the form of higher takeover prices. The advantage of
foreigners is reﬂected in bid prices. If the advantage is not ﬁrm speciﬁc, for-
eign ﬁrms would have to build expectations about other foreign ﬁrms’ bids
into their own bids. This is where the competition appears to take place—
in the bids. With perfect competition between foreign FDI bidders, the
The Contribution of FDI Flows to Domestic Investment in Capacity 171
Fig. 5C.3 Government inﬂuences on oﬀshore production




























































































































)gains from the management advantage are fully transferred to the domes-
tic economy.
A richer model might involve foreign ﬁrms with ﬁrm-speciﬁc advan-
tages, such as proprietary technology, seeking out a suitable target from lo-
cal ﬁrms with a range of productivity or proﬁt performances, and choos-
ing one that is expected to deliver the strongest productivity or proﬁt
growth. If the extent of the “advantage” is speciﬁc to the combination of
domestic ﬁrm and foreign ﬁrm, the takeover could include an underper-
forming domestic ﬁrm. The foreign ﬁrm would also get a semipermanent
advantage that could not be competed away by other foreign or domestic
ﬁrms and not necessarily “the cream.” They would still “add cream” to the
local economy because they bring technology and raise performance.
Finally, the model seems to predict a leveleﬀect on investment, eﬃciency,
and GDP as foreign ﬁrms exploit the extent of their advantage. Canadian
evidence, at least, tends to suggest that inward FDI has important growth
eﬀects (Baldwin and Dhaliwal 2001).
Empirical Results
One general comment—and this is probably common to a lot of work in
this area—is that there does not seem to be a tight nexus between the the-
ory and the empirics. Perhaps I missed something, but it is not immediately
obvious to me how the empirical model necessarily provides a test of the
micromanagement advantage of foreign ﬁrms. I wonder whether other ad-
vantages (such as proprietary technology) and motivations could be con-
sistent with the empirical model used.
As noted, the capital ﬂows are analyzed in a simultaneous framework. A
key ﬁnding is the conﬁrmation that these ﬂows have positive eﬀects on do-
mestic investment. Long-run eﬀects from two-stage least squares estima-
tion put the FDI eﬀect (0.68) at double the loan eﬀect (0.35) with the port-
folio eﬀect (0.53) in between. Compared with the Bosworth and Collins
(1999) results, the FDI eﬀect is a little weaker, the portfolio eﬀect is much
stronger (there is no discernible eﬀect in Bosworth and Collins), and the
loan eﬀect is a little stronger. Some further exploration of the reasons for
these diﬀerences—be they in the simultaneous speciﬁcation (Bosworth
and Collins found the diﬀerent types of ﬂows to be unrelated) or equation
speciﬁcation or other reasons—might help interpretation.
It is also interesting to note that the diﬀerent types of capital ﬂows are
all found to have positive eﬀects on growth. As might be expected, FDI is
found to have a stronger eﬀect.
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